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COERCING PRIVACY
ANITA L. ALLEN•
INTRODUCTION

This Essay advances two propositions about a pair of complex
ideas that I will call "the liberal conception of privacy" and "the
liberal conception of private choice ."1 Both ideas will be familiar
to anyone who has followed the personal privacy debates in the
United States during the past three decades.
The liberal conception of privacy is the idea that government
ought to respect and protect interests in physical, informational,
and proprietary privacy. 2 By physical privacy, I mean spatial se
clusion and solitude. By informational privacy, I mean confiden
tiality, secrecy, data protection, and control over personal infor
mation. By proprietary privacy, I mean control over names , like-
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1.

I put this economical terminology of "privacy" and "private choice" to similar

Tak ing Liberties: Privacy, Private Choice, and Social Contract
Theory, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 461 (1987).
2 . See id. a t 464-66.
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nesses, and repositories of personal identity.3 The liberal concep
tion of privacy informs popular understandings of, for example,
the four invasion of privacy torts, the Fourth and Fifth Amend
ments of the U. S . Constitution, state confidentiality statutes,
federal wiretapping legislation, and proposed genetic privacy
codes.4 The liberal conception of p rivacy overlaps considerably
with the liberal conception of private property. We associate pri
vacy with certain places and things we believe we own, such as
our homes, diaries, letters, names , reputations, and body parts.
At the core of the liberal conception of privacy is the notion of
inaccessibility. Privacy obtains where persons and personal in
formation are , to a degree, inaccessible to others.5
The liberal conception of private choice is the idea that gov
ernment ought to promote interests in decisional privacy, chiefly
by allowing individuals, families , and other nongovernmental
entities to make many, though not all, of the most important
decisions concerning friendship , sex, marriage, reproduction,
religion, and political association.6 The liberal conception of pri
vate choice informs normative understandings of the First
Amendment and the substantive due process requirements of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
The concept of private choice seems to presuppose that social
life is divided into distinguishable public and private spheres,
the private sphere being a realm of individual decisionmaking
about sex, reproduction, marriage, and family. So conceived, "de
cisional" privacy has origins in classical antiquity. The Greeks
distinguished the "public" sphere of the polis, or city-state, from
the "private" sphere of the oikos, or household. 7 The Romans

3 . Recently, I have begun to count "proprietary" privacy as a distinct conception
of privacy, along with physical, informational, and decisional privacy. Se e Anita L.
Allen, Genetic Privacy: Emerging Concepts and Values, in GENETIC SECRETS: PRO
TECTING PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTI.A.. LITY IN THE GENETIC ERA 31 (Mark A. Rothstein
ed., 1997).
4 . See Allen, s upra note 1 , at 464-65 .
5 . Cf William C . Hefferman, Privacy Rights , 2 9 SUFFOLK U. L . REV. 7 3 7 , 740
( 1 995) ("[P]rivacy rights presuppose a seclusion privilege . .. . Seclusion allows for a
flourishing of difference beyond that which society tolerates in public places because
it cuts people off from direct contact with the outside world.").
6. See Allen, s upra note 1, at 465-66.
7. See HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 22-78 ( 1 958) (describing Greek
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similarly distinguished res publicae, concerns of the community,
from res privatae, concerns of individuals and families.8 The
public realm was the sector in which free males with property
whose economic status conveyed citizenship participated in col
lective governance.9 By contrast, the private realm was the mun
dane sector of economic and biologic survival.10 Wives, children,
slaves, and servants populated the private sphere, living as sub
ordinate ancillaries to male caretakers.n The classical premise
that social life ought to be organized into public and private
spheres survives in the post-Enlightenment Western liberal tra
dition, as does the premise that the private sphere consists
chiefly of the home, the family, and apolitical intimate associ
ation.
Privacy, on the one hand, and private choice, on the other,
restrain and obligate government. Government must leave us
alone as a matter of government restraint. Government also
must protect us from interference and invasion as a matter of
government obligation. There is a special point to this restraint
and obligation: where restrained and obligated to advance inter
ests in privacy and private choice, government is decent and
tolerant in a way liberals believe moral justice demands.
Relative to the moral justice liberals demand, privacy and pri
vate choice are indispensable, foundational goods. Neither priva
cy nor private choice, however, is an absolute, unqualified good.
There can be too much privacy, and it can be maldistributed.
Some liberal feminists take an appropriately skeptical view of
traditional uses of privacy and private choice to subordinate

and Roman conceptions of public and private) .
8 . C f JURGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC
SPHERE 3-4 (Thomas Burger tran s . , 1989) (describing Greek and Roman conceptions
of public and private).
9. See ARENDT, supra note 7, at 27-78.
10. See id.
11. See Anita L. Allen, Autonomy's Magic Wand: Abortion and Constitutional In
terpretation, 72 B.U. L. REV. 683, 688 ( 1992); Anita L. Allen, The Proposed Equal
Protection Fix for Abortion Law: Rej1ections on Citizenship, Gender, and the Consti
tution, 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 419, 443 ( 1995) [hereinafter Allen, Propose d
Equal Protection Fix].
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women.12 Likewise, some liberal exponents of law and economics
take an appropriately skeptical view of traditional uses of priva
cy to conceal adverse information unreasonably.13 Characteristi
cally, though, liberals of all stripes proclaim that a degree of
privacy and private choice is beneficial to individuals and a soci
ety marked by aspirations for free, democratic, and reasonably
efficient forms of life.14
It is no secret that liberals disagree among themselves about
the rights of privacy and private choice that justice requires.
Conservative-leaning liberals disagree with liberal-leaning liber
als about whether government is obligated to permit abortion,
gay marriage, drug use, and certain other fonns of conduct. 15
Conservative liberals stress traditional notions of decency and
propriety along with home and family-centered intimate lives.16

1 2. See ANITA L. ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS: PRIVACY FOR WOMEN IN A FREE SOCIETY
54-56 ( 1988); C atharine A. M acKinnon, Privacy v. Equality: Beyond Roe v. Wade, in
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 93, 1 0 1-02 ( 1 9 8 7 ) [hereinafter
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED]; Nadine Taub & Elizabeth M . Schneid er, Women's Subordina
tion and the Role of Law, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 328-55
(David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1990); see also Laura W. Stein, Living With the Ri;k of
Backfire: A Response to the Feminist Critiques of Privacy and Equality, 7 7 MINN . L.
REV. 1 153, 1 160-70 (1993) ( examining feminist critiques of privacy and equality);
Cass R. Sunstein, Feminism and Legal Theory, 1 0 1 HARV. L. REV. 8 2 6 , 8 2 7 ( 1 98 8 )
(reviewing FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra, and noting that "the d om estic sphere has
been d evalued and used as a major arena for the subord ination of women").

1 3. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 55 (2d ed . 1 977).
14. Cf MICHAEL SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A
PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 94- 100 ( 1 996) (arguing that constitutional privacy is rightly val
ued by l iberals, though for the wrong reasons); James Fleming & Linda M cC l ain,
The Right of Privacy in Sandel's Procedural Republic, in DEBATING DEMOCRACY'S

DISCONTENT 248-59 (Anita L. Allen & M ilton C. Regan, Jr. eds., 1998) (criticizing
Sandel's attack on traditional l iberal accounts of the value of p rivacy).

1 5 . See, e.g., Leon E. Trak.Tilan & Sean Gatier, Abortion Rights: Taking Responsi
585, 5 9 2 ( 1995); Mark V.

bilities More Seriously than Dworkin, 48 SMU L. REV.

Tushnet, Sex, Drugs, and Rock 'n' Roll: Some Conservative Reflections on Liberal
Jurisprudence, 82 COLUl'vl. L. REV

1531, 1536-39, 1542-43 ( 1982) (book review) ; Robin
West, Universalism, Liberal Theory, and the Problem of Gay Marriage, 25 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV.

16. See,

.

705, 7 1 1, 726-30 ( 1998).
e.g.,

Will Kymlicka,

Liberal Egalitarianism and

Civic

Republicanism:

Friends or Enemies, in DEBATING DEMOCRACY' S D ISCONTENT, supra note 14, at 131,

1 32-48 (d istinguishing conservative or "right-wing" l iberals from l iberal or "left-wing"
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Liberal liberals stress the importance of tolerating nonconformi
ty and responsible departures from traditional modes of private
life.17 All liberals agree, though, with a general principle of sub
stantial government restraint with respect to broad dimensions
of personal life.18 Subscription to this rough principle of public
and private is one of the ties that bind competing versions of
liberalism.
The impossible ideal of a private sphere free of government
and other outside interference has currency despite the reality
that, in the United States and other Western democracies, virtu
ally every aspect of nominally private life is a focus of direct or
indirect government regulation. Marriage is considered a private
relationship,

yet

governments

require licenses and medical

tests/9 impose age limits,20 and prohibit polygamous,21 incestu
ous,22 and same-sex marriages.23 Procreation and childrearing
are considered private, but government child abuse and neglect
laws24 regulate how parents must exercise their responsibilities.
The liberal ideal of a private sphere can be no more than an ide
al of ordinary people, living under conditions of democratic self
government, empowered to make choices about their own lives
that are relatively free of the most direct forms of governmental
interference and constraint.
The first proposition that I will advance against the preceding
background is this: although the liberal conception of private
choice is flourishing, as evidenced by the growing acceptability
of homosexual unions25 and abortion rights,26 the liberal concep-

liberals, and identifying the respects in which both are liberal).
17. See id. at 1 32-34.
18. See id.; see also SANDEL, s upra note 14, at 4-5 (defining liberalism).
19. See, e.g. , CONN. GSN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-24 (West 1997); GA. CODE ANN. § 193-40 (Harrison 1991).
20. See, e.g. , MICH. COMP. LAWS A."'N . § 551. 103 (West 1998).
21. See, e.g. , CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-190.
22. See, e.g. , id. § 53a-191.
23. See, e.g., LA. C!V. CODE A.'IN. art. 89 (West 1997).
24. See, e .g. , TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-15-401 (1997).
25. See, e.g., Baehr v . Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 61 (Haw. 1993) (holding that a denial
of marriage license to homosexual couples constitutes sex-based discrimination);

II
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tion of privacy is not flourishing similarly. One detects signs of
an erosion of the taste for and expectation of privacy. Neither
individuals, institutions, nor government consistently demand or
respect physical, informational, and proprietary privacy. Liber
als may need to rethink the claims they have always made
about the value of privacy. We are forced to be free. Liberal gov
ernments cannot permit us to sell ourselves into slavery. Are we
forced to be private? Should we be? Should liberals urge govern
ment to force people to be modest, keep sexual and family mat
ters confidential, get off of mailing lists, install caller-ID block
ers, and sanitize their memoirs?
The second proposition that I will advance relates to the first:
traditional liberal conceptions of privacy and private choice have
survived appropriately strenuous feminist critique, re-emerging
in beneficially reconstructed forms.27 As a result of the feminist
critique, we understand that the conditions of confinement,
forced modesty, obedience, and unaccountability that once con-
stituted the private sphere are not a model of privacy worthy of
the name. Ironically, just when meaningful, unoppressive forms
of privacy and private choice are becoming imaginable and avail
able to women,28 privacy is losing its cache.
What good are the ideals of physical, informational, and pro
prietary privacy that survive feminist critique if no one sub
scribes to them? Everyone should want privacy, for reasons lib
eral moralists have stated, and for other reasons relating to re
sponsibility and participation that they have tended to overlook.
What if, however, some people do not want privacy? "Coercing

RICHARD A POSNER, SEX AL'<D REASON 202 n.38 (1992) (noting a 1989 Gallup poll in
which 47% of respondents favored legalizing homosexual relations, up from 43% in
1977); Mireya Navarro, 2 Decades Later, Miami Passes Gay Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
2, 1998, at A1; cf Rutgers Council of AAUP Chapters v. Rutgers, 689 A2d 828, 831
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997) (surveying public and private-sector trends in the
acceptance of domestic partnerships).
26. See David J. Garrow, No End is in Sight for A bortion Battle, NEWSDAY (NY.),
Jan. 20, 1998, at A31, available in 1998 WL 2655066 (noting "increased public sup
port for early abortions").
27. See supra notes 12-14.
28. See Allen, supra note 1, at 4 70-77.

•
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privacy"-imposing privacy norms to make sure everyone lives
in accordance with a particular vision of privacy-would be prob
lematic. That kind of intolerant moralism is part of the problem
with the military's "Don't ask, Don't tell" policy respecting gay
service members; that kind of intolerant moralism was part of
the problem with the cult of domesticity. Nonetheless, I suggest
that imposing privacy norms to undergird the liberal vision of
moral freedom and independence is generally consistent both
with liberalism and with the egalitarian aspirations of feminism.
I. TECHNOLOGY AND THE T.AJ3LOIDS
The final decades of the twentieth century could be remem
bered for the rapid erosion of expectations of personal privacy
and of the taste for personal privacy in the United States. Re
cent polling data as well as high profile litigation and policy de
bates suggest impressively high levels of concern about physical
and informational privacy.29 Certain legal and policy trends; cer
tain modes of market, consumer, and political behavior; and cer
tain dimensions of popular culture, though, suggest low levels of
concern.30 I sense that people expect increasingly little physical,

29. See Marc Rotenberg, Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC): Privacy
Surveys, (visited Sept. 9, 1996) <http://www .epic.org/privacy/survey>. Professor M arc
Rotenberg, Adjunct Professor of Law at the Georgetown University Law Center in
Washington, D.C., heads EPIC and maintains its excellent website. Well-respected
privacy surveys include Professor Alan F. Westin's periodic surveys for Privacy &
American Business, and the Equifax/Harris Consumer Privacy Surveys by Louis H ar
ris and Associates, who also sometimes collaborate with Professor Alan Westin. See
Louis Harris & Associates, The 1996 Equifax-Harris Consumer Privacy Survey (Oct.
8, 1996). According to Professor Rotenberg, the Georgia Tech Graphics, Visualization
& Usability Center World Wide Web Survey ("GVU \VVfW Survey") is the most
comprehensive poll of web users. See, e.g., Graphics, Visualization & Usability Cen
ter, GVU's 8th WWW User Survey (visited Oct. 30, 1 998) <http://www.gvu.gatech.
edu/user_surveys/survey-1997-10>; see also Dr. Alan F. Westin and Danielle M aurici,
E-commerce and Privacy: What Net Users Want, Survey Report (June 1 9 98).
30. See Eric Fisher, Stores Find Value in Tracking Buys; Privacy Group Q uestions
Practice, WASH. TIMES, June 15, 1998, at D 1 4, available in 1998 WL 3450474 (not
ing grocery store's practice of tracking consumer purchase patterns using a magne
tized "loyalty program" membership card, and noting "strong consumer popularity for
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informational, and proprietary privacy, and that people seem to
prefer less of these types of privacy relative to other goods.
An erosion of privacy-related tastes and expectations could
have numerous causes. These causes could include an avalanche
of technologies that make it easy and advantageous for us to
make ourselves available to others (e.g., cellular phones, fax ma
chines, e-mail); easy and advantageous for our government to
keep track of us (e.g., video surveillance of urban streets, data
banking, testing); and easy and advantageous for the corporate
sector to collect and exchange personal information about us
(e.g., phone surveys, data-banking, mailing lists). Technologists
hope that someday soon we may be wearing computers capable
of transmitting data around the world, as casually as we wear
eyeglasses and wristwatches.31
Another cause of erosion in privacy-related tastes and expec
tations could be an avalanche of two related kinds of opportuni
ties. First, opportunities to earn money and celebrity by giving
up privacy voluntarily, and second, opportunities to consume
other people's privacy and private lives on the cheap:
magazine or tabloid;

$1.50 for a

$19.95 for access to the Internet. Opportu

nities to earn money and celebrity include opportunities to write
books, to sell personal information to publishers, and to appear
on sensational television programs designed to expose shocking
intimacies. Only now, the intimacies that once were shocking
when exposed are merely titillating. Opportunities to consume
other people's privacy include the purchase of magazines and
newspapers containing personality profiles, or spending time on

loyalty program s " despite the resulting invasion

of privacy); Sarah Ann Nelson,

Internet Traders Swap Beanies-and Trust , USA TODAY, July 20, 1998, at 15A,
available in 1 998 WL 5730887 ( n oting the thriving Internet trade in the popular
Beanie Babies with minimal concerns about privacy).
31.

Approximately two hundred such technologists participated in the Second In

ternational Symposium on Wearable Computers, held October 19-20, 1 9 9 8, in Pitts
b urgh, Pennsylvania, which profiled new and emerging wearable computing technolo
gy. The event was sponsored by The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engine ers

Comp uter Society. See Wearables: Out in the World (visited Jan. 18, 1999) <http://
wwv.;.media.mit.ed u!wearables/out-in -the-world>.
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the Internet during which one can view records containing per
sonal financial information about others. One can even watch
strangers on-line in real time as they groom themselves and in
teract with their intimates.
With regard to the latter, I am alluding to the young woman
named Jenni who first garnered national attention last year for
creating the JenniCam website, from which paying customers
can watch her live out her life.32 Jenni trains a video camera on
a spot in her bedroom.33 For a few dollars, one can watch her do
many of the things adults ordinarily do in the privacy of their
apartments.34 The SaraCam project, launched and discontinued
by station Bravo in

1998, offered live pictures-twenty-four

hours a day-from the bedroom of another young woman, Sara.35
In absolute terms, the number of us willing to sell privacy may
be small, but the number of us who want to buy others' privacy
is large enough to insure that entrepreneurs will make private
facts available in the market in any number of attractive forms.

32. See JenniCam (visited Dec. 1, 1 998) <http://www.jennicam.org>.
33. See id.; see also Rosa Prince, Sara Draws Back the Curtains for All, THE I N
DEPENDENT (London), Feb. 3, 1 998, at 2 ("Fans of the Internet site JennCam [sic],
featuring 24-hour live pictures from inside an American woman's bedroom, can now
tune into a British version-SaraCam.").
34. As of December 1998, Jenni charged $15 per year for "membership." See
JenniCam: Frequently Asked Questions (visited Dec. 1 , 1998) <http://www.jennicam .
org/faq/membership.htmb. Many features of the site, however, are accessible free of
charge.
35. See Bravo Girlcam (visited Sept. 28, 1 998) <http://www.bravo.co.uklhtml/
girlcam.htmi> (discontinued); see also Prince, supra note 33, at 2 . Prince writes:
Viewers of the Internet station Bravo were invited to vote for a British
Jenny [sic] from a short-list of three young women. . . . [A spokesman]
for Bravo[] denied SaraCam's audience would be dominated by dirty old
men. "It'll be more like a real soap opera," he said. "Sara has a great
personality and she's bound to be throwing loads of parties. On the other
hand there will probably be quite a lot of time when all you will be able
to see is Sara's cat asleep on her bed or Sara brushing her hair." . . .
The camera can be turned off or moved away if Sara wants a little pri
vacy. And while the self-confessed show-off said .
she i s unshockable,
it is understood no nudity will be involved.
!d. Visitors to Sara's site will now discover that she has, in her own words, "mutat
ed into your friendly agony aunt, Staff Nurse Gertie," complete with a new web
page.
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The question these developments raise for me is whether some
one ought to do something to stop the erosion of expectations
and tastes.
The conjecture that the taste for privacy and the expectation
of privacy are eroding is consistent with the observation I have
made elsewhere that privacy norms play an expansive role in
morals, politics, and law.36 Privacy is not dead. In morals,
though with significant cultural variations, expectations of, and
mutual respect for, the privacy of certain places, communica
tions, and behaviors constrain daily intercourse. In politics, par
ticularly in Western-style democracies, privacy stands virtually
on a par with liberty and equality as a core liberal value.37 Pri
vacy as a political value, however, is not limited to liberal
thought or liberal regimes. People around the world consider
protecting at least some privacy interests a core function of good
government.38 In law, virtually every country's written constitu
tion or comparable basic law contains privacy principles limiting
authorized government access to people and their possessions.39
The civil law of individual Western European nations and the
official directives of the European Community include broad pri
vacy protection regulating the disclosure of personal and com
mercial information.40

36. See Anita L. Allen, Constitutional Law and Privacy, in A COMPANION TO PHI
139-55 (Dennis Patterson ed. , 1996) (expanding

LOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY

and supporting above assertions regarding the expansive role of privacy in l aw , m or
als, and politics); Anita L. Allen, The Jurispolitics of Privacy, in RECONSTRUCTING
POLITICAL THEORY: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES

68-84 ( M ary Lyndon Shanley & Uma

Marayan eds., 1997) [hereinafter Allen, The Jurispolitics of Privacy] (exam i ning con
ventional understanding of privacy rights).

37. See Allen, The Jurispolitics of Privacy, supra note 36, at 68.
38. See, e.g. , Common Position (EC) Adopted by the Council on February 20, 1995
with a View to Adopting Directive 94, 80 IOWA L. REV. 697 app. at 698-700, 704,
711 (1995) [hereinafter Common Position]; Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Constitution
alism and International Organizations, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 398, 433-34
(1996).
39. See, e.g., DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
GERMANY 10-17 (1994); Michelle Lynn M cClure, An Analysis of the New Russian
Constitution, 4 J. lNT'L L. & PRAC. 601, 609-11 (1995)
40. See, e.g., C ouncil of Europe-Organisation for Economic C o-operation and Devel-
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1999]

COERCING PRIVACY

733

Privacy as a legal norm is especially pervasive in the United
States. The First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amend
ments of the U.S. Constitution implicitly guarantee rights of pri
vacy.41 Statutes and the common law create additional rights of
privacy for American victims of unwanted intrusion, publicity,
and breaches of confidentiality.42 Americans now have an array
of positive privacy rights to physical seclusion and limited pub
licity under the common law, the Constitution, and various stat
utes, and constitutional rights to a government that is supposed
to leave people alone to make a range of decisions in peace and
with relative autonomy.43 I could be wrong about an erosion in
privacy-related tastes and expectations. The popularity of anony
mous and encrypted communication on the Internet could be
evidence that technology has not worn away the taste for priva
cy. Let us suppose arguendo, however, that the conjectured ero
sion is real. Should we do something about it? Should govern
ment? Should industry? Should consumers? If we wanted to stop
the erosion, how could we? One way to address the erosion
would be to stop the avalanche of technology and commercial
opportunity responsible for the erosion. We could stop the ava
lanche of technology, but we will not, if the past is any indica
tion. In the United States, with a few exceptions like govern
ment-funded human cloning and fetal tissue research, the rule is
that technology marches on.44
We could stop the avalanche of commercial opportunity by

intervening in the market for privacy; that is, we could (some

opment: Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters, opened for
signature Jan. 25, 1 988, 27 I.L . M. 1 160, 1 16 1 ; Common Position, s upra note 3 8 .
41. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 3 8 1 U.S. 4 7 9 , 4 8 4 ( 1965).
42. See, e.g. , Lilliam R. BeVier, Information About Indiuiduals in the Hands of
Gouernment: Some Reflections on Mechanisms for Priuacy Protection, 4 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 455 (1995); David W. Melville & Harvey S. Perlman, Protection for
Works of Authorship Through the Law of Unfair Competition: Right of Publicity and
Common Law Copyright Reconsidered, 42 ST. LOUIS U. L . J . 363 ( 1 998).
43. See, e.g., P lanned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852, 884 ( 1 992) (noting
"the right to make family decisions and the right to physical autonomy").
44. See Mark W. Davis, Fetal Tissue Transplants: Restricting Recipient Designa
tion, 39 HASTINGS L .J. 1079, 1079-90 (1 988).
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way or another) increase the costs of consuming other people's
privacy and lower the profits of voluntarily giving up one's own
privacy. The problem with this suggested strategy is that, even
without the details of implementation, it raises the specter of
censorship, repression, paternalism, and bureaucracy. Privacy is
something we think people are supposed to want; if it turns out
that they do not, perhaps third parties should not force it on
them, decreasing both their utility and that of those who enjoy
disclosure, revelation, and exposure.
Of course, we force privacy on people all the time. Our elected
officials criminalize public nudity, even to the point of discourag
ing breastfeeding.45 Prison authorities throw felons into solitary
confinement. Parents punish children by consigning them to
"time outs" in isolated corners of their homes. It is one thing,
the

argument

might

go,

to

force

privacy

on

someone

by

criminalizing nude sun-bathing and topless dancing. These ac
tivities have pernicious third-party effects and attract vice. It
would be wrong, the argument might continue, to force privacy
on someone, in the absence of harm to others, solely on the
grounds that one ought not say too much about one's thoughts,
feelings, and experiences; one ought not reveal in detail how one
spends one's time at home; and one ought not live constantly on
display. Paternalistic laws against extremes of factual and phys
ical self-revelation seem utterly inconsistent with liberal self-ex
pression, and yet such laws are suggested by the strong claims lib
eral theorists make about the value of privacy. Liberal theorists
claim that we need privacy to be persons, independent thinkers,
free political actors, and citizens of a tolerant democracy.46
Walling off the avalanche of technology and commercial oppor
tunity via regulation and prohibition may be violative of liberal,
libertarian, and market values. Halting the erosion without bu
reaucracy and coercion may be a more promising route. Here the

45. See, e.g., Durmeriss Gruver-Smith, Note, Protecting Public Breast-Feeding in
Theory But Not in Practice, 19 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 167 (1998).
46. Cf Robin West, Tak ing Freedom Seriously, 104 HARV. L. REV. 43, 44-45 (1990)
(arguing that "the traditional l iberal faith in the individual is somewhat m isplaced").
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focus should be on strengthening individuals to stand up to
the avalanche: empower fellow-citizens-through preaching and
teaching-to hold on to their own privacy and to consume less of
others'. This alternative approach-strengthening the moral
foundation of the community-simply may be too difficult. The
market for private facts not only feeds the taste for consuming
the privacy of others; it simultaneously constructs such tastes.
The teacher and the preacher must compete with market and
marketing forces that also are teaching and preaching that
Americans should tell all, sell all, and know all. Certain seg
ments of the market may be at work in ways consistent with
improving individual moral fiber. The market has brought us
products such as caller-ID blockers and cryptography programs
that make us more able to conceal from others who we are and
what we think. My sense, though, is that technology-assisted
accessibility is more alluring than old fashioned inaccessibility.
The picture I am painting of the demise of privacy expecta
tions and preferences may sound gloomy, but it is only as
gloomy as privacy is important in ways that matter. If privacy
were not important, it would make no difference that people are
more willing to give up privacy than they used to be. It would
make no difference that people are even more attracted to gossip
and intimate facts about others than they used to be. It would
make

no

difference if technology has made willingness to give up

privacy more profitable and the appetite for others' private lives
more easily fed.

II. PRIVACY AS INDISPENSABLE AND FOUNDATIONAL
Some people complain bitterly about privacy invasions in envi
ronments such as the workplace.47 People are shocked to learn
about the "cookies" they leave as they traverse the Internet.48

47. See Larry 0. Natt Gantt, II, An Affront to Human Dignity: Electronic Mail
Monitoring in the Private Sector Workplace, 8 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 345, 345-50

( 1 99 5).
48. For a broad overview of the inform ational privacy issues raised by the use of
the Internet, see TECHNOLOGY AND PR.lVACY: THE NEW LANDSCAPE (Philip E. Agre &
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Bioethicists focus on the privacy implications of genetics and

HIV testing.49 Legislatures enact privacy laws.50 Privacy commis
sions and task forces convene regularly. 51 Some people really care
about privacy; my point, however, is that many people do not.
The group that does not care much about privacy may consist
of individuals who share some things in common. The regard
one has for privacy or particular forms of privacy may be partly
a function of one's generation, educational background, and
wealth. An upper middle-class person can afford to care about
the privacy of her body. She does not need to take a job as a
stripper, whereas a poor, uneducated person might. Generation
al differences in the taste for privacy may be significant in the
United States, as younger Americans appear to be learning to
live reasonably well and happily without privacy. Young adults
seem to take exposure for granted and many understand that
they live in virtual glass houses. Anyone with sophistication
about the Internet or the credit and insurance industries knows
that it is easy and cheap to find out facts about friends, neigh
bors, and strangers.52 I may not be able to walk into your bed
room, but I can find out how much you earn, where you work,
your Social Security number, and how much you paid for your
house. Young adults today understand that their medical re
cords are not seen solely by their doctors, and that cameras
posted in workplaces, at ATM machines, and on the public
streets monitor their conduct. They know about the night detec
tion devices and hyperbolic microphones that enable others to
see and hear inside their homes.53
Marc Rotenberg eds., 1997) [hereinafter TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY].
49. See Kristin M. Raffone, The Human Genome Project: Genetic Scree ning & the
Fundamental Right of Privacy, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 503, 519-22, 544 (1997).
50. See, e .g. , The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1994) (regulating disclo
sure of records); Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. §
1232g (1994) (regulating disclosure of educational records).
51. See gene rally Robert M. Gellman, Can Privacy Be Regulated Effectively on a
National Le ve/2 Thoughts on the Possible Ne ed for International Privacy Rules. 41
VILL. L. REV. 129, 134 (1996) (noting establishment of the Privacy Protection Study
Commission in 1974).
52. See TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY, s upra note 48, at 17.
53. Furthering the popularity of such technology, night detection devices are mar-
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My one-time University of Michigan classmate, the entertain
ment mogul Madonna, symbolizes some of the generational dif
ferences to which I am referring. Early in her career, she re
sponded cleverly to outmoded privacy conventions by flouting
them. She deconstructed female modesty by wearing her under
wear as outerwear and by turning her sexual fantasies into
songs and coffee table books. She capitalized on eroded tastes
and expectations of privacy by turning herself and everyone
around her into mass media stars.54 Her commercially successful
full-length feature film Truth or Dare took us on an intimate
tour of her personal and professional life. 55 The message was
that happiness and success do not require privacy; indeed, they
are antithetical to privacy.
For people under forty-five who understand that they do not,
and cannot, expect to have many secrets, informational privacy
may now seem less important. As a culture, we seem to be
learning how to be happy and productive--even spiritual
knowing that we are like open books, our houses made of glass.
Our parents may appear on the television shows of Oprah
Winfrey or Jerry Springer to discuss incest, homosexuality, mis
cegenation, adultery, transvestitism, and cruelty in the family.
Our adopted children may go on television to be reunited with
their birth parents. Our law students may compete with their
peers for a spot on the MTV program The Real World, and a
chance to live with television cameras for months on end and be
viewed by mass audiences. Our ten-year-olds may aspire to have
their summer camp experiences-snits, fights, fun, and all
chronicled by camera crews and broadcast as entertainment for
others on the Disney Channel.
Should we worry about any of this? What values are at stake?
Scholars and other commentators associate privacy with several

keted by popular firms, including the upscale chain Sharper Image. See Tech Today:
Help Seeing in the Dark, STAR-TRIBUNE (Minneapolis-St. Paul), Dec. 18, 1 997, at
13E, available in 1997 WL 7594235.
54. See generally Ingrid Sischy, Madonna and Child, VANITY FAIR, Mar. 1998, at
206 (noting Madonna's artistic career, business enterprises, and lifestyle).
55. See TRUTH OR DARE (Miramax 1 9 9 1 ) .
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important clusters of value. Privacy has value relative to n orma
tive conceptions of spiritual personality, political freedom, health
and welfare , human dignity, and autonomy. In 1890, E.L.
Godkin published a magazine article defending privacy for its
supposed "spiritual" value.56 His quaint, elite-sounding tone and
theme were echoed in the famous law review article published
later the same year by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis .57
For all three men, the photographic and printing technologies
developed in their day threatened the privacy of home and fami
ly.58 They believed that private homes and families were essen
tial for the spiritual well-being of civilized men.59 In 1905, the
Georgia Supreme Court, in Pavesich v. New England Life Insur
ance Co., became the first court expressly to affirm the existence
of a legal right to privacy.60 In Pavesich, the emphasis was not
on spiritual man, but political man, as the court made the case
for privacy in political terms. The court reasoned that the soci al
contract surely must have a provision guaranteeing the protec
tion of privacy.61 If not, what citizen would agree to the soci al
contract? The Georgia court's argument presupposed that it is
rational and natural to desire control over one's personal like
ness and identity.62
Psychologists have long emphasized the unhealthy effects of
depriving individuals of opportunities for socially defined modes
of privacy. In the 1970s and 1980s, social psychologists argued

56. See E.L. Godkin, The Rights of the Citizen, JV.-To His O w n Reputation,
1890, at 58, 65-66. Godwin wrote:

SCRIBNER'S, July

Personal dignity is the fine flower of civilization, and the more of it
there is in a community, the better off the community is
.... But without privacy its cultivation or preservation is hardly possible. . . . [Newspaper journalism] has converted curiosity into what economists call an e f
fectual demand, and gossip into a marketable commodity.

!d.
57. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193 (1890).
58. See id. at 195.
59. See id. at 193-94.
60. See Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S .E. 68, 69-70 (Ga. 1905).
61. See id. at 69.
62. See id.
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that opportunities for physical and informational privacy were
important to mental well-being and social exchange .63 Physical
and informational privacy practices serve to limit observation
and disclosure that are inimical to the well-being. Philosophers
and legal theorists began urging in the 1970s that the great
growth of privacy rights in tort law, the constitutional right to
privacy, and state and federal privacy statutes serve the inter
ests of human dignity and autonomy.64
Liberals explain the value of privacy and private choice in
relation to their consequences for individuals and society, as
well as in relation to dignitarian and deontic ends. Liberal moral
philosophers maintain that respecting the many forms of privacy
is paramount to respect for human dignity, personhood, moral
autonomy, workable community life , and tolerant democratic
political and legal institutions .65 In a memorable essay, philoso
pher Jeffrey Reiman once closely linked privacy to the formation
of individual personhood: " [p] rivacy is a social ritual by means of
which an individual's moral title to his existence is conferred."66
Some theorists wrongly condemn privacy when privacy is con
strued in Reiman's terms .67 So construed, privacy can seem to
s erve the interests of selfishness or an exaggerated individual
ism. The formation of self-concept and intimate relationships on
which workable family and community life depend, however,
requires opportunities for privacy and private choice. Privacy is
down time. Privacy allows me to rest, retool, and as a result,
better prepare myself for my social responsibilities, whether
they be familial, local, or global . Privacy has value as the con-

63. See, e.g., CARL D. S C HNEIDER, S HAME, EXPOSURE AND PRIVACY ( 1 977).
64. See, e .g., PHIL OSOP H I C AL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY (Ferdinand
David Schoeman ed., 1 984); Joel Feinberg, Autonomy, Sovereignty and Privacy: Mor
al Ideals in the Constitution?, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 445 (1983).
65. See, e .g. , Jeffrey H . Reiman, Privacy, Intimacy, and Personhood, 6 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 26 (1976).
66. ld. at 3 9 .
67. See, e.g., William A . Parent, Privacy: A Brief Survey of the Conceptual Land
scape, 1 1 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TEC H . L.J. 21, 22 ( 1 995) (rejecting
Reiman's definition of privacy).
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text in which individuals work to make themselves better
equipped for their famili al , professional, and politic al roles . With
privacy, I can try to become competent to perform and achieve
up to my capacities, as well as to try out new ideas and practice
developing skills.
To speak of "coercing" privacy is to call attention to privacy as
a foundation, a precondition of a liberal egalitarian s ociety. Pri
vacy is not an optional good, like a second home o r an invest
ment account. The argument of this Essay is structurally identi
cal to an argument philosopher S amuel Freeman m akes about
drug policy.68 It would be illiberal to criminalize addi ctive recre
ational drugs in the absence of good evidence of substantial neg
ative externalities, were clear-headed cognitive capacity not a
requirement of responsible participation in a liberal democratic
government.69 Similarly, it would be illiberal to coerce privacy
were something approaching the ideal of morally autonomous
selves not a requirement of participation in a liberal democratic
society.
A hard task seems to lay before us-namely, deciding which
forms of privacy are so critical that they should become matters
of coercion. The task is especially hard because we cannot fairly
rely solely and uncritically on traditional notions of modesty and
civility. Responding to the erosion of privacy tastes and expecta
tions is not j ust a matter of outlawing nudity on the Internet or
demanding standards for broadcasters and publishers that limit
the number of confessional television shows and publications. No
one is rendered unfit for life in a liberal democracy because he
or she posed nude or appeared once on Jerry Sp ringer or Op rah .
Yet numerous little consensual and nonconsensual privacy loss
es, too trivial to protest individually, aggregate into a l arge pri
vacy loss that is a detriment to the liberal way of life . It is this
aggregation problem of cumulative accessibility and accountabil
ity to others that policymakers should begin to try to address .

68.

See Samuel Freeman, Liberalism, Inalienability, and Rights of Drug Use, in

DRUGS AND THE LIMITS OF LIBERALISM 1 1 8 (Pablo De Greiff ed., 1999).
6 9 . See id. at 124-25.

1999]

COERCING PRIVACY

741

This policymaking task should be guided by a consideration of
the cumulative effect of living without "down time" in a seclu
sion-deficient, access-compulsive world. We live in busy house
holds, with partners, children, and parents who have complete
access to us; we walk down busy streets where we are observed
and approached by others, and where video cameras may track
our moves to deter crime; law enforcers observe and monitor our
automobile driving; employers ask for blood and urine samples,
and request psychological testing; our supervisors and co-work
ers may read our mail and e-mail, and listen in on our telephone
calls; we make purchases from retailers who bank information
about us, sell it to others, and are subject to subpoenas; we trav
el with cellular phones, beepers, and laptops, and our portable
phone conversations can be intercepted by third parties. Ap
proaches to coercing privacy should take all of this experiential
reality into account while avoiding the easy assumption, at
tacked by feminist theory, that social elites know exactly what
kinds of privacy and private lives are appropriate for everyone.70
III.

FEMINIST RECONSTRUCTION

Thirty years ago, the prevailing liberal visions of privacy and
private choice were in desperate need of re-thinking. The then
prevailing visions have now been re-thought: Scholars and activ
ists have undertaken "deconstruction," "revisioning," and "recon
struction" of old notions of privacy and private choice with much
success. Scholars now think differently about private life and
private lives. Historians, social scientists, and jurisprudes have
joined forces to discredit the myth that the home is a haven. 7 1

7 0 . S e e ge ne rally Linda C . M c Cl ai n, Inviability and Privacy: The Castle, the Sanc
tuary, and the Body, 7 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1 9 5 , 208-09 ( 1 9 9 5 ) (asserting that criti
cal examination of privacy protection and public/private distinctions "have been a
significant component of feminist j urisprudence. [Such critiques] target not only the
legai treatment of privacy, but also an array of beliefs and social practices about
privacy and the private sphere, and the ways in which they construct and constrain
women's lives.").
7 1. See id. at 209 (citing CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY
OF THE STATE 193 ( 1 989)).
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As a result, we have at our disposal the intellectual tools to look
realistically and critically at the quality of life in households and
families. We understand now that the nominally private sphere
may not provide meaningful opportunities for privacy and pri
vate choice to certain people and groups .
Liberal philosophers (other than liberal feminists) have tend
ed to overlook the risks of harm that privacy poses. These risks,
however, must be factored into any complete ethical analysis of
privacy. Feminists have demonstrated that the private sphere of
home and family is a site of peril and subordination.72 Feminists
claim that privacy facilitates subordination and shields violence
against spouses, children, and the elderly.73 If what feminists
say is true, it might seem to follow that one ought not l ament
the apparent demise of privacy-related tastes and expectations . I
believe a different conclusion is warranted.
The concept of privacy has been central to the feminist
critiques of Western liberal societies. Feminist scholars h ave
been in the forefront of liberal , progressive, and communitarian
efforts to debunk and rebuild liberal understandings of privacy
and private choice.74 Many feminists explicate privacy-con
strued primarily as the private sphere of home and family
life-as the problematic context of traditional female subordina
tion and isolation in subservient, dependent s ocio-economic
roles.75 They argue on good evidence that violence and neglect
can befall vulnerable individuals in any area of domestic or com
mercial life when a community or its government abrogates re
sponsibility to citizens and enterprises tagged "private . "76

72. See Catherine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality

Under Law, 1 0 0

YALE L.J. 1 2 8 1 , 1 3 1 1 ( 1 9 9 1 ) (stating that "the l aw's privacy i s a sphere of sanctified

isolation, impunity, and unaccountability"); McClain, supra note 70, at 209 (arguing
that the private sphere of home and family can be a place of "rape, battery, and
other exploitation").
73.

See MacKinnon, supra note 72, at 1 3 1 1 ; McCl ain, supra note 70, at 2 0 9 .

74. See, e .g. , Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of the Law, 8 9 YALE L.J. 4 2 1
( 1 980); MacKinnon, supra note 7 2 .
7 5 . See, e.g. , M c C l a i n , supra note 7 0 , at 209-12 (exploring t h e feminist argument
that the private sphere i s

a

sphere of s u bordination, abuse, and oppression) .

7 6 . See id. ; see also MacKinnon, s upra note 7 2 , at 1 3 1 1 (arguing that "the doc-
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Feminist critics equate traditional ideas of privacy and private
choice with ( 1 ) barriers to escaping confinement in traditional
roles;77 and (2) ideals of isol ation, independence, or individualism
that conflict with the reality of the encumbered self78 and with
ideals of ethical care, compassion, and community.79 Not all
feminists , however, believe in the possibility of reconstructing
privacy and private choice consistent with gender equality.
When all is said and done, some feminists retain a decidedly
negative stance toward privacy, professing the need to relegate
privacy and private choice to the trash bin of outdated i deolo
8
gy . 0 By contrast, I accept the basic feminist critique of privacy
and private choice, but I also believe worthwhile, egalitarian
conceptions of privacy and private choice survive the criti que .81
A.

Overcoming Under-Particip ation

Feminists exploded the ass umption that the proper role of
women is to live under the authority of men as daughters ,
wives, and mothers. The lives of American women once consisted
chiefly of domestic tasks , such as cooking, shopping, gardening,
cleaning, and childrearing. "Conventions of female chastity and
modesty have shielded women in a mantle of privacy at a high
cost to sexual choice and self-expression."82 Seclusion and subor-

trine of privacy has become the triumph of the state's abdication of women in the
name of freedom and self-determination").
77. See McClain, supra note 70, at 209-10.
78. See MICHAEL SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 20-21 (2d ed.
1998).
79. Cf ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE 9 (1997) (discussing an "ethic of care"
and the "act of caring" as traditionally private and separate from the public legal
realm).
80. See, e.g. , MacKinnon, s upra note 12, at 93-102 (arguing that the liberal notion
of privacy is outmoded and inconsistent with feminism); Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking
Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 1016-28 ( 1984) (arguing that
" [t] he rhetoric of privacy . . . reinforces a public/private dichotomy that is at the
heart of the structures that perpetuate the powerlessness of women") .
81. For a detailed discussion of egalitarian conceptions of privacy and private
choice, see Anita Allen, Privacy, in A COMPANION TO FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY 456-65
(Alison M. Jaggar & Iris Marion Young eds., 1998) .
82. Allen, supra note 1 , at 471. The good news is that expectations of emotional
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dination meant that women generally were unable to utilize
their full capacities to participate in society. Maternal and soci al
roles kept women-who might otherwise have distinguished
themselves in the public sphere as businesswomen , scholars,
government leaders, and artists-in the private sphere .83 To in
crease women's participation in society, feminist activists have
advocated for the right of women to hold property, to vote , and
to work outside the home in j obs of varied description for which
they would be compensated on an equal basis with men.84
Women have under-participated in societal affairs . Although
the under-participation critique is sweeping and true, the cri
tique does not suggest that women should not seek privacy, or
eschew opportunities for personal privacy and private choice.
Women today, especially educated and middle-class women,
have lifestyle options that they can exercise with privacy-related
interests in mind. Some of their options (e.g., celibacy, childless
ness) have a cost. Encouraging women to recognize their options,
and to exercise their options in ways that acknowledge that
women's privacy and private choice are worth something, would
be an appropriate feminist emphasis. Educating oneself, delay
ing marriage , controlling the timing of childbearing, working
part-time-all of these are techniques women can use, and are
using, to create lives in which they can enj oy forms and degrees
of privacy unknown to American women fifty years ago. A felici
tous balance between privacy and disclosure can come about if
lessons about exploiting privacy and lessons about exploiting the
new openness in public life are offered in tandem . Some femi
nists seem to assume that privacy and disclosure are differing

intimacy have fostered beneficial personal ties for women, and the domestic arts
have reached high levels of excellence.
83. See, e . g. , Tracy E. Higgins, De mocracy and Feminism, 1 1 0 HARV. L. REV.
1657 1672-73 ( 1997).
'
84. See Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspective s
From the Women's Movement, 6 1 N .Y.U. L. REV. 589, 624 ( 1986) (demonstratir; g
that feminist activists have worked to enhance women's access to political and eco
nomic opportunity by challenging laws that denied women the right to vote, to own
property, and to work outside the home).
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models of how one might live.85 Privacy and disclosure are better
understood, however, as important and necessary dimensions of
a range of good lives one can elect to live.
B.

Overcoming Violence

Liberal society thrives on open government and closed person
al relations. Feminists have stressed that closed p ersonal rela
tions make it more likely that serious harm will go undetected.86
A parent-child relationship may involve sexual abuse or neglect;
a marital relationship may involve beatings or rape . Govern
ment cannot protect vulnerable citizens from domestic violence if
unbreachable boundaries of legally sanctioned privacy surround
the family. The worthiness of the privacy ideal has been called
into question in the United States, where problems of domestic
violence suggest a need for more, rather than less, involvement
in the traditionally "private" spheres of home and family life .87 It
is no longer acceptable that men and women batter one anoth
er-or that parents batter their children-in the n ame of anger
or discipline.
Domestic violence is a serious problem that additional eco
nomic opportunities and civil rights for women appear not to
have abated.88 Both substantive law and law enforcement prac
tices need to reflect an understanding that households, no less
than 3treet corners, can be places .of peril. Our households are

8 5 . See, e .g. , MacKinnon, supra note 72, at 1 3 1 1 ; Robin West, Reconstructing Lib
e rty, 59 TENN. L. REV. 441 , 455-56, 458-61 ( 1 992).
86. See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
8 7 . See ge nerally Carolyne R. Hathaway, Case Comment, Gender Based Discrimi
nation in Police Reluctance to Respond to Domestic Assault Complaints, 75 GEO. L.J.
667, 671 & n . 20 ( 1 986) (demonstrating that victims of domestic violence are almost
always women and that the social, physical, and economic impact of such violence is
severe); De ve lopments in the Law-Legal Responses to Domestic Viole nce , 106 HARV.
L. REV. 1 5 0 1 , 1 5 0 1 ( 1993) [hereinafter Legal Responses to Domestic Viole nce ] ("By
any standard, domestic violence must now be recognized as the most pressing social
and legal problem in the United States. ") .
88. S e e Legal Responses t o Dome stic Violence , supra note 87, at 1 502-03 (noting
the persistence of "stereotypes and misconceptions about domestic violence" that hin
der the development of effective legal responses to domestic violence).
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places of peril, but it does not follow that we perpetually ought
to station agents of government in our living rooms, observing
us and second-guessing every decision we make about our per
sonal lives in the name of saving us from inj ury at home. \Ve do
better with solutions to the problems of domestic violence that
preserve conditions that afford opportunities for safe and mean
ingful seclusion, intimacy, and decisionmaking. Battered wom
en's shelters protect women by providing health s ervices, s afe
companionship, and privacy. It would be unfortunate indeed if
the price women had to pay for escape from domestic abuse w as
a life without opportunities for privacy.
The U . S . Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia estab
lished the Domestic Violence Unit of the District of C ol umbia
l ocal court system to provide expert response and adj udication of
domestic violence charges and to help women cope with the so
cial and economic consequences of abuse .89 This program and
others like it compel women to relinquish seclusion and private
information for the sake of prosecuting their assailants, but the
program does not assume that daily lives lived in wholly ex
posed s ettings are the ideal remedy for violence. The s ol ution to
domestic violence anci the DeShaney problem of public neglect of
private violence90 is not to end families and seclusion, but to
make better use of evidence of chronic violence and imminent
peril. The act of making better or different use of evidence re
garding what occurs among family members and cohabitators i s
a way o f reconstructing privacy-redrawing lines o f public and
private. The line between public and private already has been
redrawn substantially in the criminal law of rape where, in
many jurisdictions, "marital privacy" no longer immunizes m ar
ried men from prosecution for unconsensual sex with their wives. 9 1

8 9 . See Bill Miller, Team Created to Fight Domestic Violence, WASH. POST, Apr. 2 ,
1 9 9 6 , at C3.
9 0 . See generally DeShaney v . Winnebago County Dept. of Soc. Servs . , 489 U.S.
1 8 9 ( 1989) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment places no affirmative duty upon
state government to protect its citizens).
9 1 . · See, e.g. , Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as Preroga tive and
Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2 1 1 7 , 2 163 n . 1 6 3 ( 1996).
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Righting the Conservative Tilt

Some feminists view the concept of privacy as having an in
herently conservative tilt in the Western liberal societies where
it has had the greatest currency.92 The privacy banner waves
away beneficial public intervention calculated to reinvent cus
tomary standards of behavior that lead to female under-partici
pation and male aggression or harassment. Legal feminists com
monly argue that the liberal ideology of "privacy" is inherently
conservative and has slowed the growth of egalitarian laws ben
eficial to vulnerable classes of women.93 Another argument pos
its that a conservative ideology of privacy supports the notion
that gays and lesbi ans belong, if at all , silent and repressed in
the "closet. "94
Conservatives generally have opposed government welfare
programs, especi ally any that are amenable to characterization
as inessential.95 It is perhaps not surprising, then, that they
generally have opposed government funding for poor women's
"elective" abortions .96 Many conservatives and liberals interpret
the right to privacy, in the context of contraception and abortion,
as a negative right against government decisionmaking respect
ing procreation, not as a positive right to governmental pro-

92. See gene rally Linda C . McClain, The Pove rty of Privacy ?, 3 C OLUM . J. GENDER
& L . 1 1 9 , 1 50-72 ( 1 992) (examining feminist critiques of privacy).

9 3 . Cf Cass Sunstein, Ne utrality in Constitutional Law (With Special Refe rence to
Pornography, Abortion and Surrogacy) , 92 C OLUM . L. REV. 1, 31 ( 1 992) (noting that
"an abortion decision does not involve conventional privacy at all").
94. See, e .g. , C athy A. Harris, Note, Outing Privacy Litigations: Toward a Contex
tual Strategy for Lesbian and Gay Rights , 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 248, 268-69
( 1 997) ("The claim of privacy becomes a trap for gays and lesbians . . . which in
turn perpetuates the[ir] oppression.").
95. See, e .g. , Matthew Diller, Entitlement and Exclusion: The Role of Disability in
the Social We lfare System, 44 UCLA L. REV. 3 6 1 , 365 ( 1 995) (noting the desire of
conservatives to "contract" the scope of government aid to the disabled) ; Kathleen A.
Kost & Frank W. Munger, Fooling All o( the People Some of the Time: 1990's Wel
fare Reform and the Exploitation of American Value s , 4 VA. J. Soc. POL'y & L. 3,
31 ( 1 996) ("Welfare reform is obviously a rollback of social programs that have been
described by conservatives for a decade as favoring 'special interests ."').
9 6 . See Kelley P. Swift, Comment, Hope v. Penates: A bortion Rights Unde r the
Ne w York State Constitution , 61 BROOK. L. REV. 1473, 1479 n.42 ( 1 995).
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grams designed to make contraception and abortio n services
available to those who cannot afford to p ay.97 For some, it i s self
evident as a matter of logic that a privacy right is not something
for which the public should h ave to p ay.
In the United States, women won the right to obtain legal
contraception and abortion in the 1960s and 1970s under the
banner of "the right to privacy."98 M any feminists blame the em
phasis on privacy in abortion law for the failure of legal efforts
to secure government funding for poor women's abortions . 99 Per
haps it is no accident that equal protection, rather than privacy,
is now apparently the more promising jurisprudential basis for
advocating gay rights since the privacy debacle of Bowe rs v .
Hardwick . 1 00
In an attempt to reconceive publi c and private, a number of
feminists have argued that certain privacy rights for the poor
entail public support . 101 These efforts strike me as exactly right.
There is no need to concede the battle to liberalism's most con
servative exponents. The liberal theorists who see the privacy
case for abortion funding as doomed to fail because of the sup
posed inherent conservative tilt of privacy rights talk l ack the
will to impose a new construction of privacy over the old concep
tion of negative freedom. The idea that privacy is simply a nega
tive liberty-a freedom from, as opposed to a claim to-can be
challenged, and has been challenged, on its own term s . 102

9 7 . See, e .g. , Allen, Proposed Equal Prote ction Fix, supra note 1 1 , at 444.
98. See, e.g. , Roe v. Wade, 410 U . S . 113 ( 1973) (holding that the right to privacy
secured by the Constitution includes the right to abortion); Griswold v. C onnecticut,
381 U.S. 479 ( 1965) (using the right to privacy to hold that married individuals
have the right to obtain legal contraception).
99. See Allen, Proposed Equal Protection Fix, s upra note 1 1 at 4 5 1 -54.
1 0 0 . 478 U . S . 186 ( 1986). But see Powell v . State, No. S98A0755, 1998 WL 804568,
at *7 (Ga. Nov. 23, 1 998) (declaring Georgia sodomy statute upheld in Bowers inval
id under the Georgia Constitution).
1 0 1 . See, e.g. , Rachel N. Pine & Sylvia A. Law , Envisioning a Future for Reproduc
tive Liberty: Strategies for Making the Rights Real, 27 HARV. C .R.-C . L. L. REV. 407,
4 2 1 & nn. 53-54 ( 1 992).
1 02 . See, e.g. , id. ; Dorothy E. Roberts, Rust v. Sullivan and the Control of Knowl
edge, 61 GEO. WASI-l. L. REV. 587, 640-41 ( 1 993).
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Re scu ing the Public and the Private

Critics of liberalism are apt to insist that the public/private
distinction is altogether an ideological tool of subordination in
societies in which white men with property dominate other
groups. Feminists charge that privacy j ustifies exclusive monop
olies over social resources as well as societal indifference to the
violence and poverty that characterize the "private" lives of
many women and children.1 03 The private sphere is permeated
by government. The public sphere is ubiquitous . Law, and there
fore the arms of "public" government, defines and mediates the
complex entity-to-entity relations that constitute "private" life .
For example, a person is permitted t o drive a car, adopt a child,
practice a religion, marry outside of her race, expect confidenti
ality from physicians, belong to exclusive private clubs, and use
birth control pills, all because of legislative and constitutional
provisions created and enforced by government. 1 04 Moreover,
government serves essential policing and adj udicative functions
without which personal privacy would be impossible for most
people . If someone is being harassed in certain ways that violate
privacy, he or she can call the police . If someone harms anoth
er's privacy interests , the harmed individual may be able to
bring a lawsuit to have losses compensated.
To the extent that government is infused with p atriarchal,
heterosexual ideals, men's and women's privacy rights are likely
to reflect patriarchal, heterosexual ideals of a private sphere . As
a woman, "my" legal privacy is limited by "his" and "their" con
ceptions of the good life . Thus , a lesbian's desire to live in peace
with her female lover and to adopt her lover's children may be
thwarted by others' conceptions of the morally good family.
Some li berals continue to speak of "the public" and "the pri
vate" as if they were determinate, fixed categories constraining
good government. One can argue, though still within the frame-

103.
104.
STAT.
90, §

See, e.g. , MACKINNON, supra note 7 1 , at 193.
See , e .g. , CAL. CONST. art. I, § 4 (guaranteeing religious liberty); C ON N GEN.
ANN . § 45a-724 (West 1 998) (regulating adoption); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
8 (West 1 998) (regulating driver 's licenses).
.
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work of liberalism, that public and private are contingent,
transformable conceptions of how power ought best to be allocat
ed among individuals, soci al groups, and government. It is not
necessary to defend privacy and private choice on grounds that
presuppose the existence of fixed, determinate, uncontestable
Platonic realms . It is therefore not a devastating feminist chal
lenge to observe that the public/private distinction is something
of a myth.
Feminist critiques of privacy leave the liberal conceptions of
privacy and private choice very much alive . The longing for per
sonal time and personal decisionmaking can linger long after the
grip of p atriarchy over women's bodies and lives is loosened.
Feminists need not rej ect the l anguage of public and private or
the broad principles of inaccessibility, control, and decisional
autonomy that undergird privacy rights. They do need to stress
that the lines between public and private should be renegotiated
and redrawn as necessary to further dignity, safety, and equali
ty. Feminists have good reason to be critical of what the privacy
of the private sphere has signified for women in the p ast and
what the rhetoric and jurisprudence of privacy rights can signal
for the future. At the same time, there is little doubt that wom
en seeking greater control over their lives already have begun to
benefit from heightened soci al respect for appropriate forms of
physical , informational, proprietary, and decisional privacy.
E.

Fe min ism, Libe ralism, and a Ne w Ge ne ration

Liberal theory survives feminists' theoretical assessments of
privacy, but I am less certain that liberal society or feminism
can survive the demise of privacy as a preferred obj ect of desire .
Liberalism has taught that without privacy we are degraded,
unfree, unhappy, untolerated/05 yet Jenni-the young woman
who sells continual Je nniCam access to her apartment over the

105. See ge nerally Robin L. West, Libe ralism Rediscovere d: A Pragmatic Definition
of the Liberal Vision, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 673 ( 1 985) (exploring liberalism as an ide
ology that defines privacy and autonomy as the good).
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Internet-seems fine. Is Jenni fine? The answer depends in p art
on whether we are willing to judge Jenni on her own terms . No
one is forcing her to appear on the Internet. She is collecting
money by exploiting viewers who watch hoping to be titillated.
She is not being exploited; she is not watched at all times
and everywhere she goes. As a result, while her apartment i s
not strictly private, one must assume she gets some privacy
somewhere, sometime. Madonna, we know, gets quite a bit of
privacy. 1 06
It is of p articular interest to feminism that some women (like
Jenni) have little taste for privacy. Thirty years ago, in the e arly
days of the women's movement, women declared the personal to
be political . 1 07 By 1990, women had begun implicitly to declare
that the personal is commercial. 108 Put differently, women first
reconstructed privacy by rej ecting outmoded conceptions of do
mesticity, modesty, reserve, and subordination to men; now they
reconstruct privacy by exploiting it for income, celebrity, or both.
Feminists are bound to split over the issues of self-exposure or
obj ectification raised by Jenni and Madonna, the s ame way they
split over issues of self-exposure or objectification raised by pros
titution, pornography, and surrogate motherhood . 1 0 9
If privacy is as important to the formation of personhood and
political freedom as some liberal moral theorists have argued, 1 10
1 0 6 . See Sischy, supra note 54, at 206.
107. See, e .g. , MACKINNON, s upra note 7 1 , at 1 9 1 .
108. See ge ne rally Rosemary J . Coombe, A uthorizing the Celebrity: Publicity Rights,
Postmodern Politics, and Unauthorize d Ge nders, 10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 365
( 1 992) (examining the ways that commercialization and celebrity have altered privacy
and produced engendered and endangered identities); Cheryl B . Preston, Consuming
Sexism: Pornography Suppression in the Larger Context of Commercial Images , 3 1
GA. L . REV. 7 7 1 , 840-52 ( 1 997) (arguing that feminist attacks o n privacy and advoca
cy for the suppression of pornography are now giving way to advocacy for commer
cial solutions).
1 0 9 . See ge nerally Lori B. Andrews, Beyond Doctrinal Boundaries: A Legal Frame
work for Surrogate Motherhood, 8 1 VA. L. REV. 2343 ( 1 995) (analyzing the effect of
different legal frameworks on women and surrogate motherhood); Peter Halewood,
Law's Bodies: Disembodiment and the Structure of Liberal Prope rty Rights , 81 IOWA
L. REV. 1 3 3 1 ( 1996) (examining the commodification and obj ectification of women in
liberal thought and contemporary society).
1 10. See, e .g. , J. Braxton Craven, Jr., Personhood: The Right to Be Let Alone , 1976
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we should be worried-feminists and nonfeminists alike-by the
optional and challenged character taken on by personal privacy.
Some valued forms of privacy are and should be optional. Some
times giving up optional informational privacy i s a good thing,
as when a guilty criminal freely decides to plead guilty rather
than accept the protection of the Fifth Amendment to the U . S .
Constitution. Adopting-or acceding to-a whole lifestyle pre
mised on disclosure , however, ought not be an option. For that
reason, maybe we should be prepared to force people to h ave
private lives and to live their private lives in private . Not, as in
the past, so they can be kept in their place, but so that they can
reap the full dignitarian and political consequences of privacy.
Moralism? Snobbery? Classism? Civic republicanism? I think not.
Liberals should continue to urge that, to the extent possible ,
people must be free t o exercise their j udgment and live i n accord
with their own visions of the good life . We want government to
be neutral, in the plausible way Dworkin suggested a number of
years ago,m between competing conceptions of the good. A con
ception of the good that permits privacy to be waived , however,
i s like a vision of the good that permits freedom to b e w aived. As
liberals, we should not want people to sell all their freedom,
and, as liberals, we should not want people to sell all their pri
vacy and capacities for private choices. This is, in part, because
the liberal conceptions of private choice as freedom from govern
mental and other outside interference with decisionmaking
closely link privacy and freedom. The liberal conception of pri
vacy as freedom from unwanted disclosures, publicity, and loss
of control of personality also closely links privacy to freedom. I
am not suggesting that Jenni should turn off her camera and
sweep floors for her boyfriend, but I am suggesting that she

DUKE L.J. 699 (arguing that the liberal concept of the right to be let alone can be
secured with a recognition of a right to personhood); John Lawrence Hill, Mill,
Fre ud, and Sk inne r: The Concept of the Self and the Moral Psychology of Liberty ,
2 6 SETON HALL L . REV. 92, 167-70 ( 1 995) (showing that the rise o f liberalism and
its requirement of personal freedom altered the formation of personhood and political
liberty).
1 1 1 . See RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 1 9 1 ( 1985).
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should turn off her camera so that, free from the gaze of others,
she can live a more genuinely expressive and independent life .
I a m also suggesting that regulatory measures aimed a t curb
ing the culture of exposure for the sake of "forcing" people to
love privacy and live privately would be consistent with liberal
values.
IV.

LIBERALISM AND THE POLITICS OF THE GOOD

In De mocracy 's Disconte n t , Michael Sandel distinguishes be
tween the "old" and the "new" privacy. 1 1 2 The old privacy, which
he endorses, centers on home and family as reflections of an in
dividual's identity . 1 13 Our privacy requires that government and
fellow citizens let us alone to fulfill roles and responsibilities
central to our identities and not necessarily of our own choosing.
Custom, religion, and family obligate us in ways others ought to
respect. The new privacy, which Sandel rej ects, centers on au
tonomous choice s . 1 14 Under this vision, our privacy requires that
government and fellow citizens let us alone to m ake important
decisions and live in accordance with those decisions . 1 1 5 S andel
argues that the old privacy is historically and logically connected
to the civic republican strand in American thought, while the
new privacy is historically and logically connected to the liberal
strand. 1 1 6 For Sandel, a core requirement of government is that
it recognize that selves are thickly constituted by religion, cul
ture, and family ties . 1 17 Individuals are obligated by identities
and attachments to lifestyles of which others in society may dis
approve . 118
The version of liberalism to which I subscribe understands
persons as shaped partly and substantially by social forces not of

1 12 .
1 13 .
1 14.
1 15.
116.
1 1 7.
1 18 .

See
See
See
See
See
See
See

SANDEL, s upra note 14, at 94-1 00,
id. at 94-97 .
id. a t 97-100.
id.
id. at 94- 1 0 0 .
id. a t 9 2 .
id.
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their own choosing, but also and importantly by their own choic
es-their own decisions, commitments, and compromises. E du
cation i s vital to the formation of persons who understand hu
man capacities for choice and the limits of those capacities. Per
sons are educated by families, schools, and religious institutions,
and increasingly by exposure to television, radio, print media,
films, and the Internet. The direct and indirect education they
receive from these sources varies in content and intensity. Not
all of what they learn contributes constructively and beneficially
to liberalism's "formative proj ect."119
My conception of privacy (and private choice) is distinctly lib
eral in its assumption that individuals are and should be well
informed, morally autonomous choosers. My conception i s also
egalitarian and feminist in its assumption that a background of
educational, economic, and sexual equality is a requirement of
meaningful choice. In a just and liberal democracy, one's ability
to choose how one shall live will be constrained through taxation
and regulation so that others can achieve a comparable p alette
of choices. The "old" civic republican conception of privacy rights
as public recognition of obligations generated by encumbrances
of identity120 may well have been what Warren and B randeis
had in mind. So much the worse for them. 121 Surely my privacy
means more than that others should let me alone to be the best
darn African-American, Methodist, suburban wife and mother I
can be. Privacy i s also a matter of freedom to escape, rej ect, and
modify such identities. I should be free to make and remake
myself.
Privacy is a matter of escaping as well as embracing encum
brances of identity. \Vithout adequate privacy, there can be no

1 1 9. See William A. Galston, Expressive Liberty, Moral Pluralism, Political Plural
ism: Three Sources of Liberal Theory , 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 867 ( 1 999); see also
Michael J. Sandel, The Constitution of the Procedural Rep u blic: Liberal Rights and
Civic Virtues, 66 FORDHA..\1 L. REV. 1, 3 ( 1 997) (defining the "formative proj ect").
1 2 0 . See SANDEL, s upra note 78, at 94-97 .
1 2 1 . See Anita L. Allen & Erin Mack, How Privacy Got Its Gender , 1 0 N . ILL. L .
REV. 441 ( 1990) (examining feminist assessments of approaches to u nderstanding the
value of privacy taken by the Warren and Brandeis article).
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meaningful identities to embrace or escape, and no opportunities
to engage in meaningful reflection, conversation, and debate
about the grounds for embracing, escaping, and modifying par
ticular identities . Undergirding the liberal democratic w ay of life
will require public policies mindful of the cumulative threat to
pnvacy.
Government will have to intervene in private lives for the
s ake of privacy and values associated with it. Protecting privacy,
however, rarely will require government to proscribe specific
categories of conduct. The men who sunbathe in the nude on
warm Sundays in Berlin's Tiergarten are as morally autonomous
as their friends and neighbors who do not. 122 The threat to liber
alism is not that individuals s ometimes expos e their naked bod
ies in public places, display affection with same-sex partners in
public, or broadcast personal information on national television.
The threat to liberalism is that in an increasing variety of ways
our lives are being emptied of privacy on a daily basis, especially
physical and informational privacy.
Government already, and with minimal controversy, interferes
with individual privacy in the interest of protecting third parties
or children from serious harm . In the near future, liberal gov
ernment may have to proscribe and regulate discl osures and
publications precisely in the interest of preventing cumulatively
harmful diminutions of the taste for or the expectation of priva
cy. So empowered, there is a risk that government will make
mistakes and engage in discrimination. Proscribing breast-feed
ing, while permitting men to go about bare-chested, is one exam
ple of error and discrimination with which we are all familiar.
Government could use its power to single out particular groups
for repression, and one legitimately worries that public policies
will penalize certain behaviors unfairly. Consider prohibitions
against public displays of affection by same-sex partners and
"Don't ask, Don't tell" policies. Coercing privacy in the strong
sense of dictating what people must always keep to themselves

1 2 2 . See, e.g., James Woodall, 48 Hours in . . . Berlin Worldwide, THE INDEPEN
DENT (London), Aug. 15, 1998, at 52, available in 1 998 WL 167455 8 7 .
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and what they may disclose to others would threaten the liberal
egalitarian ideal of tolerance. A plurality of notions and opportu
nities for privacy must be permitted to flourish.
When it comes to government, coercing privacy m ay be as
much a matter of self-restraint as restraint of others. Govern
ment's greater and greater ability to demand, access , and ma
nipulate information about us contributes to the increasingly
lowered expectations of privacy. It may also be a matter of reg
ulating the corporate sector more aggressively, requiring fair
information practices that give employees and consumers great
er control over what information is collected and how it is used.
Fear of a government misstep i s sometimes a reason for rec
ommending government inaction. There is both empirical evi
dence and normative philosophical argument supporting the
proposition that paradigmatic forms of privacy (e . g . , seclusion,
solitude, confidentiality, secrecy, anonymity) are vital to well-be
ing. 123 It is not simply that people need opportunities for privacy;
the point is that their well-being, and the well-being of the liber
al way of life , requires that they in fact experience privacy.
Coming up with public policies that are responsive to the ag
gregation problem-the problem of many small privacy losses
cumulating into a large overall loss-will require special cre
ativity on the part of those responsible for making policy. It may
require a mode of thinking environmental policy analysts engage
in all the time, namely, broad, long-term multi-factored assess
ments of costs, benefits and non-quantitative values. We ulti
mately may need a national privacy "czar" to promote the ideal
of policies and practices that encourage and protect essential
forms of privacy without intolerance or undue paternalism.
Suppose there is no efficient way to make public policy that i s
responsive to the aggregation problem because, for example, i t
would require mutual knowledge and coordination within a
l arge and varied group of institutional actors. My observations
about the importance of privacy to liberalism would hold, as a

1 23 .

See s upra note l l O and accompanying text.
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matter of principle, even if the transaction costs of regulatory
approaches to "coercing privacy" are prohibitive in practice .
Moreover, if we can do no better than to leave things precisely
as they are, then the seriously liberal way of life is in j eopardy. I
am hopeful that we can do at least a little better than leaving
things as they are. My proposal is that public policymakers be
gin to take account of the cumulative effects of eroding privacy
tastes and expectations, and weigh the risks of either doing
something or doing nothing. I do not pretend that this Essay has
answered all of the questions it raises. We are very much at the
beginning, not the end, of a fresh line of thinking about privacy,
culture, and regulative norms .

